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Alice, who does not have any sophisticated quantum technology, delegates her quantum computing
to Bob, who has a fully-fledged quantum computer. Can she check whether the computation Bob
performs for her is correct? She cannot recalculate the result by herself, since she does not have any
quantum computer. A recent experiment with photonic qubits [1] suggests she can. Here, I explain
the basic idea of the result, and recent developments about secure cloud quantum computing.
First-generation quantum computers will be imple-
mented in the cloud style, since only limited groups,
such as governments and large companies, will be able to
possess such expensive and high-maintenance machines.
How can client’s privacy be protected? How can the
client be convinced of the correctness of the result al-
though she does not have any quantum computer?
Imagine that you do online shopping. Of course, you
do not want to reveal your private information, such as
what you bought, your credit card number, and your
home address, etc. to someone else. Alternatively, imag-
ine that a pharmaceutical company uses a time-sharing
service of a super-computer provided by an electric com-
pany to run their own molecular dynamics program. The
pharmaceutical company must want to make sure that
the program, which is their top secret, will not be di-
vulged. In short, securing client’s privacy in cloud com-
puting is one of the most central problems in today’s
digital society. In fact, there has been a long research
history in classical cryptography on this problem, and
several important results have been obtained (such as the
famous fully homomorphic encryption by Gentry [2]).
In quantum computing, Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and
Kashefi [3] proposed in 2009 a protocol of secure cloud
quantum computing which uses the measurement-based
quantum computation [4]. In the protocol, Alice needs
only a device that emits randomly-rotated single-qubit
states. Bob has a sufficient technology to conduct the
universal measurement-based quantum computing. Al-
ice sends many randomly-rotated single-qubit states to
Bob, and after that Alice and Bob perform some two-
way classical communications. It was shown in Ref. [3]
that if Bob is honest, Alice can obtain the correct out-
put (correctness), and whatever the malicious Bob does,
he cannot learn anything about Alice’s input, the pro-
gram, or the result of the computation (blindness). The
protocol was experimentally demonstrated with photonic
qubits in 2012 [5].
Plenty of theoretical developments have also been done
since then [6–18]. For example, it was pointed out
in Ref. [7] that in stead of single-photon states, Al-
ice has only to generate weak coherent pulses. It was
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also shown in Ref. [11, 12] that single-qubit measure-
ments are also enough for Alice. The original blind pro-
tocol that uses the cluster state has been generalized
to other resource states, such as Affleck-Kennedy-Lieb-
Tasaki (AKLT) state [8], Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal
topological state [9], and the continuous-variable cluster
state [10], etc. The communication complexity between
Alice and Bob was also studied [17, 18].
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FIG. 1: The cloud quantum computing. Alice delegates her
quantum computation to Bob.
In this way, malicious Bob cannot learn Alice’s infor-
mation. However, there is another problem: he can still
tamper with it! If malicious Bob wants to fool Alice,
he can forge the result, or just deviate from the correct
procedure. Then, the result of the computation is no
longer correct, but Alice has to accept the wrong result,
since she cannot check the correctness of the result by
herself (remember that she does not have any quantum
computer). How can Alice avoid such an unpleasant situ-
ation? In the above example of the pharmaceutical com-
pany, such a question is crucial, since the pharmaceutical
company, who pays a huge amount of money for the ser-
vice, does not want to be palmed off with a wrong result
by a fishy company trying to sell a fake quantum com-
puter.
A protocol is called verifiable if the probability that the
client accepts a wrong result can be sufficiently small. In
Ref. [6], Fitzsimons and Kashefi improved the Broadbent-
Fitzsimons-Kashefi protocol [3] so that it is verifiable.
(See also Refs. [11, 20] for other verification protocols.)
The basic idea of these verifiable protocols is to hide
“trap” qubits in the computation. Bob does not know
the position of the traps, and therefore he touches a trap
and changes its state with a certain probability if he de-
2viates from the correct procedure. Alice checks the trap
qubits, and accepts the result of the computation only if
no trap is altered. The probability that Alice accepts a
wrong result is the probability that the lucky Bob can
alter computational information without touching any
trap. If Alice uses a quantum error correcting code, she
can make such a probability exponentially small: if the
computation is encoded with a quantum error correcting
code, Bob has to apply some global operations to alter
the logical state, and such a requirement of global oper-
ations drastically increases the probability of the server
touching a trap. (An analogy is that a tank will more
likely hit a land mine than a pedestrian, because the
tank sweeps larger space.)
A full implementation of verification protocols [6, 11,
20] is, however, very challenging with current technol-
ogy. In [1], the authors provide a simplified protocol fea-
sible with current technology, and demonstrate it using
four photonic qubits. The simplification trades off some
advantages of the original protocol [6] (and Ref. [11]),
such as the above mentioned exponentially small prob-
ability of accepting a wrong result, and therefore many
runs of protocols are necessary. Furthermore, generaliza-
tions of their simplified protocol tuned for four qubits to
non-scalable but many-qubit quantum computers are not
clear. However, the essential idea that hiding traps can
detect malicious Bob is cleverly achieved in spite of the
four qubits limitation, and therefore their result is the
first important proof-of-principle demonstration of test-
ing quantum server.
Interestingly, verification is an important concept not
only in cryptography but also in foundations of physics
and computer science [19, 20]. Ultimately, physics is the
activity of theoretically predicting a phenomenon, and
experimentally confirming it. However, the behavior of
a quantum many-body system is notoriously too com-
plicated to be efficiently simulated on a classical com-
puter, and therefore such a prediction-and-confirmation
paradigm will break down in the many-body limit. A
verification method is expected to be a solution: it en-
ables an experimentalist who has only limited quantum
technology to “verify” that a quantum many-body sys-
tem in front of her is correctly evolving according to her
theory.
Isn’t it very exciting that a study of cryptography will
shed new light on the foundation of physics?
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